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Abstract
The question of the relationship between ideas and
realisations is an old one and a still ongoing discussion in
(legal) philosophy and theory. The use of some results
can support present endeavours concerning the building
of legal ontologies. Kelsen’s pure theory of law is the
basis for our comprehensive legal ontology. Other
improvements are the integration of visualisations and
relations between the various levels. Some experiments
have shown the feasibility of our approach. Future work
will concentrate on a simplified use of this ontology and
a formalisation with an object-oriented and deductive
database.
1 Introduction
At first glance, legal ontologies seem to be only another
new and fashionable concept for research on legal
knowledge representation. This view does not take into
account the research in AI & law (an overview can be
found in the proceedings of the ICAIL conferences).
Besides remarkable success the main question of the
proper conceputalisation of the legal domain has not
been solved yet (Schweighofer 1996). Hybrid knowledge
representations like the DataLex (Greenleaf et al. 1995),
Flexlex (Smith et al. 1995) or KONTERM workstations
(Schweighofer 1996) are the best instruments available
for practical applications at the moment. Therefore the
shift of emphasis from prototypes to a theory of
conceptalisations is a welcome and necessary step and
may yield to new insights.
Valente (Valente 1995, Valente and Breuker 1994,
Valente and Breuker 1995) proposes ontologies as the
missing link between legal theory and AI & law. Legal
theory should provide ontological assumptions and
perspectives. The concept of ontology is defined as an
explicit specification of the conceptualisation of the legal
domain.
Valentes decomposition of legal functions leads to six
categories of primitive legal knowledge. The frame based
ontology of van Kralingen and Visser (van Kralingen
1995, Visser 1995, Visser and Bench-Capon 1996)
distinguishes three classes of entities: norms, acts and
concept descriptions. Frame structures list all attributes
relevant for the entity. Both ontologies focus on
knowledge engineering. The aspects of knowledge
sharing and knowledge reuse as typical problems of
knowledge engineering receive high priority.
In our view, legal theory may provide some input for
supplementing these ontologies in the sense of computer
science. Our motivation is not the refining of the existing
conceptualisation but the integration of other important
factors. The constituent parts are ideas (unversalia),
objects (res) and virtual reality in the form of visual
communications.
As a starting point we have chosen the well-developed
pure theory of law of the famous Austrian legal
philosopher Kelsen. His theory is focused on the
distinction between ideas and objects. Another advantage
is the already good developed formalism.
The remainder of the paper is organised as follows:
Section 2 gives a short overview on the historic roots of
ontologies. Section 3 describes idea and realisation in
Kelsen’s pure theory of law. Section 4 introduces virtual
reality as a new level. Section 5 shows the tentative
model. Finally, we provide some conclusions in section
6.
2 Historic roots of ontologies
Ontology as the discipline of philosophy dealing with the
nature of being (Kaufmann and Hassemer 1994) can give
more than name to the ontology in the sense of
information systems. Both ontologies of Valente and van
Kralingen/Visser have the emphasis on ideas. The
difficulty of describing  properly the world as concepts is
treated as open texture problem.
The relationship between realisations (objects) and ideas
(concepts) is a highly discussed subject in philosophy
and goes back to the so-called universalia dispute [for an
overview see (Kaufmann and Hassemer 1994, Ritter
1971)] in the Middle Ages. Figure 1 shows the
relationship between the three approaches:8
 
res
Platon:
“universalia ante rem”
Aristoteles:
“universalia in re”
Nominalism:
“universalia post rem“
Figure 1: universalia dispute
Three different positions can be distinguished: The
Platonian position (universalia ante rem) stressed the
existence of concepts as ideas besides the various
objects. The Aristotelian position (universalia in re) said
that concepts existed only in the objects. In the position
of the nominalism (universalia post rem), concepts are
developed only in human thinking. This dispute is still
unsolved but due to space constraints we cannot describe
the approaches in detail.
A good illustration is the concept of the Stufenbau
(hierarchical order) of the legal order. At first, it was a
descriptive model of law (post rem). Then, the model
was adopted as paradigm of law-making resulting in a
transposition of this concept into a prescriptive model
(ante rem). Today, the Austrian legal order is realised
according to this concept. This example shows the
possibility that a concept post rem can be transformed to
a concept ante rem.
Concepts are still the most important form of abstraction
in legal thinking. Legal theory has developed many
models how the relationship between the idea and the
realisation can be described properly. The advantage for
an ontology in the sense of information systems lies in
the more sophisticated conceptualisation.
The world of ideas and realisations can be described with
models of interest jurisprudence (Bydlinski 1991) or the
pure theory of law by Kelsen (Kelsen 1960). Without
diminishing the results of interest jurisprudence we have
chosen the more developed model of Kelsen as a starting
point.
3 Idea and realisation in Kelsen’s pure
theory of law
The following description of Kelsen’s pure theory of law
is focused on the aspect of the formalisation of ideas and
social reality. Figure 2 gives an overview:9
Level of social reality
Law: norms (Recht im objektiven Sinn)
Is 1: Factual substratum of the act: paper, legal data base
Is 2:   Interpretative content
of the act
Ought: legal meaning of the act
Basic Norm (Grundnorm)
Figure 2: Conceptualisation in Kelsen’s pure theory of law
Kelsen distinguishes strictly between is (Sein) and ought
(Sollen). The basis of his legal system is the so-called
basic norm (Grundnorm). Law (Recht im objektiven
Sinn) is composed of norms. Two different levels of is
(Sein) can be distinguished. We suggest to use the terms
is 1 and is 2 to describe these levels. Is 1 (Sein) is the
factual substratum of the act, e.g. paper or human
behaviour. Is 2 (Sein) is the interpretative result of the act
of is 1 (Sein), e.g. the content of a text. The decisive
element of Kelsen’s system is ought (Sollen). Ought
(Sollen) is the legal qualification of the act. A signed
written paper changes its normative legal meaning from a
text into a valid contract. This specific legal meaning in
the sense of validity (Geltung) is derived from the law
(Recht im objektiven Sinn). In the same way, the validity
of law is based on the basic norm (Grundnorm).
The main difference to the functional ontology of
Valente (Valente 1995) is that we distinguish between
various levels of world knowledge. Only the legal
qualification of the act gives an answer if a killing (world
knowledge) is murder, legal sanction in the form of an
execution or allowed act in an international armed
conflict.
In a later version of the pure theory of law Kelsen
introduced the concept of Modal Indifferent Substratum
(MIS). MIS consist of those elements of the language
that can be part of the descriptive as well as the
prescriptive language (Kelsen 1979). These semantic
elements are important for relations between the various
levels, formalisations, or the building of virtual realities.
The relationship between various levels of realisations
and ideas gives much insight in the conceptualisation of
the legal domain. It is not surprising that citation indices
are very important in legal information systems.
Therefore we propose the inclusion of relations in
conceptualisations. Present applications of hypertext
structures of links (Nielson 1993, Greenleaf et al. 1995,
Schweighofer and Scheithauer 1996) show a primitive
form of such conceptualisations. Improved applications
should consider the concept of MIS.
4 Visualisation as a component of
ontologies
The main new development in the dispute between ideas
and realisations is the emergence of visualisations. The
famous science fiction book of Gibson (Gibson 1984) on
a cyberspace describes a world of ideas separated from
realisations. This appearance of visualisations leads to a
major shift from res to universalia. The law will appear
as a visualisation of ideas to the citizens. This emerging
development has its roots in the development of new
graphical tools but also because of the need for better
representations (Katsh 1995). A graphical
communication may explain easily relationships difficult
to describe in words. This visual communication can be
employed like text and may change the textual world of
law to a visual world. This visualisation is closer to
Gibson’s fiction than to the virtual reality as defined in
computer science (Bryson 1996). In law, visualisation is
a form of abstraction whereas virtual reality in computer
science is the use of interfaces to create the effect of a
three-dimensional world.10
The basis for visualisation is legal symbolism. Human
beings need proper and efficient reception symbols
(Lachmayer85a, Lachmayer85b, Lachmayer93). Old
symbols are crowns, arms, citadels, castles, etc. but also
buildings, clothes or procedures. Wigs and gowns still
used in English high courts are only striking examples.
Such symbols or semiotic releasers are based on
realisations. A visualisation consists of such symbols as
description of realities or ideas.
Law (Recht im objektiven Sinn)
Symbols: semiotic releasers
Zurechnung, casuistry, formalisation
Façades, releasers, symbols
Virtual Symbols:     semiotic
releasers
-->  virtual obligation
Is 1: Factual substratum of the act: paper, legal data base
Is 2:    Interpretative content
of the act
Ought: legal meaning of the act
Figure 3: Semiotic releasers as basis for a visualisation
The main point is that the façade of the level of
realisations will be replaced by the façade of
visualisations. This form of virtual reality will be the
front end of the law for the citizen. This fact requires that
formalisations must include visualisations.
From a methodological point of view it has to be
mentioned that formalisation is the adequate method to
represent the structures of law like casuistry, whereas the
symbolism seems to be the adequate method to transform
legal content into proper semiotic releasers (or semiotic
interfaces of the new virtual reality).
5 Comprehensive legal ontology
Our comprehensive legal ontology consists of four
components: ideas, realisations, visualisations, and
relations between the various levels. For the description
of our model we use a simplified version of frames. We
are aware that some refining according to the ontology of
van Kralingen and Visser is necessary in the future. The
following figure 4 may give an overview on the relations
between the various entities of our model:11
Meta-level: system of ideas
Meta-meta-level: system of categorical ideas
Level of social reality
Level of virtual reality
Level of legal norms
Figure 4: Comprehensive legal ontology
Starting point of our ontology is the level of social
reality. Legal institutions like parliaments, courts, law
firms, etc. and realisations of law in legal gazettes, court
reporters, legal databases, contracts or administrative acts
are part of this world. The latter can be described as
substratum of signs of law. It does not make a difference
if that is done with ink on paper or with byte structures.
The (quasi)natural language knowledge representation
(or „English-like“) in the DataLex workstations
(Greenleaf et al. 1995) can be seen as the best
representation of the second level of a realisation of
norms in the sense of Kelsen done by a computer
programme.
The next level is the visualisation that is imitated
according to façades of social reality. The emergence of
visualisations requires the incorporation of these semiotic
releasers into the ontology. Visualition brings the shift
from static to dynamic semiotic releasers. Users will be
confronted with this virtual reality rather with other
realisations like texts or buildings. Legal acts will take
place electronically without going to courts or city halls.
The front-end will be the homepage of the institution and
the CGI scripts but not forms or civil servants. The CGI
forms with the incorporated help support will be the most
common virtual realisation of the law.
The third level of legal norms contains the rules for
social as well as the virtual reality in the form of the
visualisation. This level can be further divided into the
following functional categories of Valente: normative
knowledge, meta-level knowledge, responsibility
knowledge and reactive knowledge. Creative knowledge
is part of the level of legal norms (e.g. constitution) but
also in the meta-level (e.g. basic norm of Kelsen). We
would also stress the importance of further meta-levels.
A system of ideas will be the first meta-level that
corresponds to the model of Platon that is proposed in
this paper. It is fruitful for a comfortable system to add
further meta-levels like a system of categorical ideas.
Quite often concepts and their interpretation can only be
understood if the various meta-levels are taken into
account.
The relations between these levels are highly important
for a good conceptualisation of the legal domain. Ideas
and realisations are highly interrelated. Legal thinking is
highly dominated by link structures. Therefore, we
propose the inclusion of a hypertext link structure as a
proper formalisation of the relations between realisations
(administrative acts, judgements, statutes, constitutions,
literature), visualisations, law and ideas. Another
important aspect would be the inclusion of search
ontologies as a formalisation of the relationship between
legal problems and queries in a database (Schweighofer
1997).12
The following example of the concept of free movement
of goods within the European Union may give an
overview of our tentative model:
Frame Cassis de Dijon/Keck Jurisprudence
_________________________________________________________________________
__
Meta-meta-level Social contract concept of Grotius
Meta-level Social contract between European states for maintenance of
peace
_________________________________________________________________________
__
Level of legal norms Concepts of free flow of goods and mandatory requirements
Norm: Art 30 European Community Treaty
_________________________________________________________________________
__
Visualisation  EU homepage, conceptual graphs, CGI interfaces, etc.
_________________________________________________________________________
__
Ought Legal meaning of administrative acts
Is 2 Interpretative content of the act
   English-like expressions (e.g. DataLex workstation)
   Linguistic interpretations (e.g. KONTERM project)
Is 1 Official Journal/CELEX database
European Court Reports/CELEX database
European Court: judges, staff, building
_________________________________________________________________________
__
Relations Hypertext structure: links between the various levels;
search ontologies
Figure 5: Model of comprehensive legal ontology
The concept of the comprehensive legal ontology
includes besides the extension to realisations,
visualisations and relations also a vision of simplification
of the conceptualisation. Valente as well as van
Kralingen and Visser admit that their ontology is far to
complex for bigger applications in law. Therefore, we
propose a much simpler conceptualisation.
Text corpora can be seen as a collection of realisations of
law (is 1). A knowledge base can describe the level of
legal norms in the form of concepts. An automatically
generated hypertext structure will describe the relations
between these levels. Some basis for such an approach
can be found in the KONTERM workstation
(Schweighofer 1996).
6 Conclusions
Present endeavours concerning the building of legal
ontologies have to bear in mind that the relationship
between idea and realisation is an old and ongoing
discussion in (legal) philosophy and theory. The
integration of some results may greatly improve the
quality of ontologies. Our model is based on Kelsen’s13
pure theory of law. We have added visualisations and
relations as additional factors that may be helpful in this
struggle for cognition.
The tentative model of a comprehensive legal ontology
integrates realisations, ideas, visualisations and relations.
Some basic work with a simplified version within the
KONTERM workstation project has shown the feasibility
of our approach. Future work will concentrate on a
simplified use of this ontology and a formalisation with
an object-oriented and deductive database.
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